

## Message Text

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PAGE 01 STATE 123904  
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TO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

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INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY DAKAR IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY DUBLIN IMMEDIATE

AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY KUWAIT IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY LAGOS IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY OTTAWA IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY TEHRAN IMMEDIATE

USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY OSLO IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM IMMEDIATE

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S E C R E T STATE 123904

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SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 123904

E.O. 11652: XGDS 1 AND 2

TAGS: PORG, UNSC, XF, PBOR, LE, IS, SY, SA, KU

SUBJECT: SOUTH LEBANON: BASIC U.S. EFFORTS

REF: STATE 117862

1. IN REFTTEL, WE OUTLINED A STRATEGY FOR ADVANCING EFFORTS TO ENSURE IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 425 ON LEBANON. OUR EFFORTS THUS FAR HAVE RESULTED IN AGREEMENT BY THE CANADIANS, FRENCH AND BRITISH TO JOIN IN BRINGING PRESSURE ON THE ARABS TO KEEP THE PALESTINIANS IN LINE. IN ADDITION, SECRETARY GENERAL WALDHEIM CONVOKED THE UNIFIL TROOP CONTRIBUTORS TO DISCUSS ATTACKS ON UNIFIL FORCES. WHILE INCONCLUSIVE ON ANY COORDINATED DIPLOMATIC ACTION, THERE WAS NO INCLINATION TO RECALL UNIFIL FORCES NOR TO CONVOKE THE SECURITY COUNCIL FOR THE PURPOSE OF ALTERING UNIFIL'S MANDATE.

2. THE DANGER OF UNIFIL'S UNRAVELING, HOWEVER, REMAINS AND WILL REQUIRE CONTINUING EFFORTS WITH ISRAEL, WITH THE ARABS AND WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON. U.S. OBJECTIVES REMAIN THE SAME: IMPLEMENTATION OF 425 IN ALL ITS PARTS. THIS AND FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS WILL EXPAND ON OUR BASIC STRATEGY AND OUR RATIONALE FOR CERTAIN STEPS WE WISH TO TAKE IN

DEALING WITH THE SOUTH LEBANON PROBLEM:

-- (A) ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL: WE BELIEVE WE MUST PRESS BEGIN TO MAKE GOOD ON HIS PROMISE TO US IN WASHINGTON TO SET A CONCRETE DATE FOR FINAL ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL, HOWEVER  
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 STATE 123904

MUCH THE ISRAELIS WILL RESIST DOING SO BECAUSE OF THE CONTINUED PALESTINIAN CHALLENGE TO UNIFIL AND THEIR CONCERN THAT THERE WILL REMAIN IN SOUTH LEBANON AT LEAST A PARTIAL VACUUM. WE ALSO RECOGNIZE THAT THE ISRAELIS WILL WANT TO MAKE ARRANGEMENTS SATISFACTORY TO THEM AS REGARDS THE GOOD FENCE, THE CHRISTIAN MILITIA COMMANDERS, ISRAELI-LEBANESE CONTACTS, AND THE FUTURE ISRAELI RELATIONSHIP WITH THE CHRISTIAN/SHIA ENCLAVES AND THEIR MILITIAS. THE FACT IS THAT THERE IS A CATCH 22 PROBLEM. AS LONG AS ISRAELI SOLDIERS REMAIN IN SOUTH LEBANON, SYRIA IN PARTICULAR, BUT ALSO OTHER ARAB STATES, WILL NOT BE WILLING TO PRESS THE PALESTINIAN LEADERSHIP AS HARD AS WE WOULD LIKE TO CONTROL THEIR FOLLOWERS. THE REJECTIONIST PALESTINIANS ALSO HAVE REVEALED THEY THINK THEY HAVE AN OBLIGATION TO CARRY THE FIGHT TO ISRAELI FORCES AS LONG AS THEY ARE ON LEBANESE SOIL. IN ANY EVENT, CONTINUED ISRAELI OCCUPATION OF PART OF SOUTH LEBANON WILL CONSTITUTE AN IMPEDIMENT TO PROGRESS WE MIGHT OTHERWISE HOPE TO MAKE IN GENERAL MIDDLE EAST PEACE NEGOTIATIONS AND WOULD TEND TO UNDERMINE U.S. CREDIBILITY, SINCE WE HAVE MADE CLEAR OUR COMMITMENT TO SECURE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL.

-- (B) LEBANESE ARMY UNITS IN THE SOUTH: AMBASSADOR PARKER'S VIEW, WITH WHICH WE AGREE, IS THAT LEBANESE GOVERNMENT LEADERSHIP MAY RPT MAY ALREADY HAVE DECIDED IN EFFECT TO WRITE OFF SOUTH LEBANON AND TO LEAVE IT TO UNIFIL TO COPE WITH AS BEST IT CAN. WE MUST DO OUR BEST TO REVERSE THAT THINKING, IF IT IS INDEED THE REAL LEBANESE POSITION. WE ALSO AGREE THAT THERE ARE MAJOR RISKS IN SENDING UNITS. THE PALESTINIANS ARE PROBABLY THIRSTING TO CHALLENGE ANY LEBANESE ARMY UNITS THEY CAN FIND. ON THE OTHER HAND, IT SEEMS DOUBTFUL TO US THAT THE TROOP CONTRIBUTORS TO UNIFIL WOULD BE WILLING TO ACCEPT CASUALTIES INDEFINITELY WHILE THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT IS UNWILLING TO PROVIDE AT LEAST TOKEN UNITS TO SHARE THE DANGERS. OUR CONCLUSION IS THAT THE LEBANESE MUST BE PRESSURED BY US IN  
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 STATE 123904

THE FIRMEST POSSIBLE WAY TO ALLOW AT LEAST THREE COMPANIES TO GO INTO SOUTH LEBANON AS A TOKEN FORCE (AND, IF NOTHING ELSE, TO UNDERTAKE LIAISON AND INTERPRETING DUTIES IF THEY CANNOT ASSUME FRONT-LINE POSITIONS). OUR ONLY QUESTION IS WHETHER WE SHOULD EMPLOY PRESSURE IN THE FORM OF A MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OR SECRETARY INSISTING THAT THE LEBANESE

TAKE THIS STEP, FOR REASONS THAT WE WOULD OUTLINE GRAPHICALLY. GIVEN THE NATURE OF U.S. SUPPORT FOR LEBANON UP TO NOW, OUR GUESS IS THAT THE LEBANESE CANNOT REFUSE A TRULY INSISTENT U.S. REQUEST. EMBASSY BEIRUT PLEASE COMMENT.

-- FYI: IF LEBANESE CAN BE INDUCED TO SEND UNITS, WE MIGHT HAVE TO CONSIDER SUCH TRANSPORT MEANS AS UK VESSELS FROM CYPRUS TO TAKE TROOPS FROM BEIRUT TO NAQOURAH, OR HELICOPTER TRANSIT. END FYI.

-- (C) PALESTINIAN/LEBANESE LEFTIST CHALLENGES TO UNIFIL: PROBABLY BY FAR THE MOST SERIOUS IMMEDIATE AS WELL AS LONG TERM PROBLEM IS PALESTINIAN DETERMINATION TO RE-INFILTRATE SOUTHERN LEBANON AND TO CHALLENGE UNIFIL AUTHORITY. WE ARE NOT OPTIMISTIC--BUT THERE IS AT LEAST A SMALL CHANCE--THAT THE REJECTIONISTS WILL BE RELATIVELY LESS EAGER TO INFILTRATE THE UNIFIL AREA OF OPERATIONS AFTER THE ISRAELIS HAVE LEFT OR, AT LEAST, THAT MUCH OF THE RATIONALE EMPLOYED BY THE "REJECTIONISTS" AND OTHER PALESTINIANS FOR SUCH ACTION WOULD BE SERIOUSLY UNDERMINED. THE REAL PROBLEM IS WHETHER THE MAINLINE FATAH AND OTHER ELEMENTS UNDER ARAFAT'S DIRECTION WILL ALSO PUT PRESSURE ON UNIFIL. OUR INITIAL JUDGMENT IS THAT UNIFIL MIGHT BE ABLE TO COPE MILITARILY WITH THE REJECTIONIST AND LEFTIST CHALLENGES, BUT WOULD HAVE GRAVE DIFFICULTIES IN FACING A CHALLENGE WHICH INCLUDED FATAH AND THE 4,000 PLUS ARMED PALESTINIANS ABOVE THE  
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 05 STATE 123904

LITANI.

-- OUR CONCLUSION THEREFORE IS THAT A MAXIMUM EFFORT SHOULD BE MADE -- THROUGH INFLUENTIAL THIRD PARTIES AND UNIFIL TROOP CONTRIBUTORS -- TO DISSUADE ARAFAT AND THE PLO/FATAH PRAGMATISTS FROM PUTTING PRESSURE ON UNIFIL. IN LATER INSTRUCTIONS, WE WILL OUTLINE BASIC ARGUMENTS THIRD PARTIES MIGHT EMPLOY IN TRYING TO INFLUENCE PLO/FATAH LEADERSHIP, INCLUDING PALESTINIAN MOVEMENT'S INTEREST IN INTERNATIONAL RESPECTABILITY AND ACCEPTANCE.

-- (D) THE ALL-IMPORTANT SYRIAN ROLE: WE HAVE BEEN TRYING TO SET THE STAGE TO PRESS THE SYRIANS TO EXERT GREATER MILITARY AND OTHER CONTROL OVER THE PALESTINIANS BUT HAVE JUDGED THAT NOTHING SIGNIFICANT COULD BE DONE UNTIL THE ISRAELIS HAVE FINALLY WITHDRAWN. WE INTEND NOW TO EXPLORE WITH THE SYRIANS MORE SPECIFICALLY WHAT MIGHT BE DONE CONDITIONAL ON EARLY ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL (E.G., MOVING DOWN TO THE LITANI BRIDGES OR, AT A MINIMUM, TO NABATIYAH).

-- (E) ROLES OF UN AND PRINCIPAL CONTRIBUTORS: CLEARLY, ANY SUCCESS IN GETTING ARAFAT TO AGREE NOT TO CHALLENGE UNIFIL WILL BE DEPENDENT IN THE FIRST INSTANCE ON THE UN TAKING A STRONG LINE WITH HIM. IT WILL BE NECESSARY TO MAKE CLEAR TO WALDHEIM AND THE UN THAT ANY EARLIER RESERVATIONS THE U.S. MIGHT HAVE HAD ABOUT MAKING THE PLO A DE FACTO PARTY MAY HAVE TO BE IGNORED IN THE FACE OF THE NEW REALITIES. WE BELIEVE WALDHEIM SHOULD BE ENCOURAGED TO MAKE CLEAR TO ARAFAT THE SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES FOR THE PLO IF, THROUGH ITS UNCOOPERATIVE STANCE, UNIFIL THREATENS TO UNRAVEL. THE TROOP CONTRIBUTORS--IN PARTICULAR THE FRENCH AND SENEGALESE, WHO HAVE DIRECT ACCESS TO THE PLO--SHOULD ALSO BE ENCOURAGED TO CONTINUE TO PRESS THE PLO STRONGLY FOR COOPERATION. IF THE TROOP CONTRIBUTORS IN THE UN CAN ALSO BE ENCOURAGED TO PRESS OTHER GOVERNMENTS WITH INFLUENCE ON THE PLO, SO MUCH THE BETTER.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 06 STATE 123904

3. TEL AVIV FOR AMB. LEWIS: YOU SHOULD GET IN TOUCH WITH BEGIN TO SAY THAT THE SECRETARY HAS ASKED YOU TO ASCERTAIN WHEN ISRAEL WILL INFORM US OF AN EARLY "CONCRETE" DATE FOR FINAL WITHDRAWAL. YOU MAY DRAW ON ANY OF THE FOREGOING ARGUMENTS OR PLANNED U.S. STEPS WHICH YOU BELIEVE MAY BE HELPFUL.

4. FOR JIDDA: THE SECRETARY PLANS TO DISCUSS WITH FONMIN SAUD THE DIMENSIONS OF THE SOUTH LEBANON PROBLEM AND TO URGE THAT THE SAUDIS EXERT PRESSURE ON THE PLO TO COMPLY WITH THE UNIFIL MANDATE.

5. FOR PARIS: WE INTEND TO RECOMMEND TO THE PRESIDENT THAT, DURING HIS DINNER WITH GISCARD ON MAY 26, HE MAKE CLEAR OUR STRONG SUPPORT FOR THE FRENCH INVOLVEMENT IN UNIFIL, WHILE SHARING OUR VIEWS ON WAYS THAT THE RISKS AND DANGERS CAN BE NEUTRALIZED OR CONTAINED.  
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## Message Attributes

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